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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plamtiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
FRANKLIN ERIC HALLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 20060541-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from the Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, dated May 4, 2006, (the 
"Decision") and designated as State v. Halls. 2006 UT App. 142,134 P.2d 1160. A copy of 
the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by 
this reference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVDEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reves. 116 P.3d305 (Utah 
2005) applied to the Court of Appeals' consideration of Appellant's 
appeal, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing 
Appellant's challenges to the reasonable doubt jury instruction for 
plain error? 
STANDARD OFREVHCW:'determining the propriety of the instructions submitted 
to the jury presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court's instructions 
under a correction of error standard." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 7,56 P.3d 969, 
(Utah App.,2002) citing Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
ISSUE 2: Whether the instruction that the State's evidence must ueliminate all 
reasonable doubt'9 constituted reversible error in light of this Court's 
holding in Reyes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: We review jury instructions under a correctness 
standard, granting no particular deference to the trial court. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp., 850P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). Statev.Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,607, 
(UtahApp.,1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. V, which reads as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
II. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. VI, which reads as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
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process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
III. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. XIV § 1, which reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
IV. UT. CONST., ART. I § 7, which reads as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law 
V. UT. CONST., ART. I § 12, which reads as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
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examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
VI. UT. CONST., ART. I § 24, which states that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 7, 2004, this matter came for a preliminary hearing relating to the 
Information filed on August 12,2004. R001-R002. At that time, an AmendedInformation 
was filed charging Franklin Eric Halls ("Halls") with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a Second Degree Felony; Unlawful Possession of Imitation Controlled Substance, 
a Class A Misdemeanor; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor. R026-
R028. The trial court ordered Halls be held over to answer to the charges in the Amended 
Information. R029. 
On October 1,2004, the matter came for jury trial. R041. At the conclusion of the 
trial, the following instruction pertaining to the standard of reasonable doubt was given to 
the jury: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This presumption follows the defendant throughout the trial. If a 
defendant's guilt is not shown by a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be 
acquitted. 
The State must eliminate all reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
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doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is doubt based 
on reason, which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Reasonable doubt 
is not a doubt based on fancy, imagination, or wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy the mind, or 
convince the understanding of those bound to act conscientiously, and enough 
to eliminate reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable 
people would entertain based upon the evidence in the case. 
Rl 13. The jury convicted Halls of each count charged in the Amended Information. Rl 41 
at pp. 180-181. Halls waived a presentence investigation report and time for sentencing. Id. 
at p. 185. Halls was sentenced to one to fifteen years (1-15 years) in the Utah State Prison 
on the second degree felony charge, one (1) year in the San Juan County Jail on the class A 
misdemeanor charge, and six (6) months in the San Juan County Jail on the class B 
misdemeanor charge. Id. at p. 188. 
On October 5, 2004, the trial court entered its Judgment and Commitment to Utah 
StatePrison (the "Judgment") in this matter. R125-R127. On October 14,2004, Halls filed 
his pro se Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. R130. The Appellant's brief was filed on 
June 13,2005. On April 13,2006, the Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision 
(the "Decision"). 
On June 5, 2006, Appellant filed his Petition for Write of Certiorari. On July 28, 
2006, certiorari was granted by this Court and the matter was scheduled for briefing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 1,2004, information respecting a possible hit-and-run accident led Officer 
Jim Eberling ("Eberling") and Officer Travis Clark ("Clark"), a parole officer, to go to 
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Halls'parents'residence to speak with Halls. R141 atpp.78,79,99,100. Shortly after their 
arrival, Halls arrived in a pick-up truck driven by Jim Abrams ("Abrams"), who worked on 
Halls' parents' ranch with him. Id. at pp. 78, 99. 
Abrams testified that, on approach to Halls' parents' residence, he "caught a glimpse 
of [Halls] bending over, and it looked like he was shoving some stuff under the...seat." R141 
at p. 62. When they arrived at the residence, Abrams testified that Halls asked him to leave, 
which was unusual since he normally would go in and say "hello" to his mother and his 
father. Id. Abrams dropped Halls off and left the residence. Id. at p. 78. When Abrams 
arrived at his own house, he testified that he checked under the passenger seat and found a 
black piece and a box with bags inside it. R141 at pp. 62-63. Abrams testified that he took 
these items to the police station and gave them to Chief Adair ("Adair"). Id. at p. 63. 
During this time, Eberling and Clark conducted a search of Halls, his room and his 
vehicle since Clark testified that Halls had been testing positive for methamphetamme. Rl 41 
at p. 79, 100. After finding nothing in their searches, Eberling and Clark decided to take 
Halls to Eberling's office. Id. As they arrived, Eberling testified that he saw Abrams and 
Adair at Abrams pick-up truck across the street. Id at 79. 
While they were talking with Halls in Eberling's office, Adair knocked on the door 
and handed the items to Eberling that were brought in by Abrams. R141 at pp. 79-80. 
Eberling testified that Halls did not deny ownership of any of the items. Id. at p. 82. Clark 
testified that Halls told him that he was scheduled to buy an ounce of methamphetamme and 
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mix that in a cutting agent called "MSN" to produce two ounces so he could use for free and 
sell the other ounce for his money. Id. Clark testified that Halls told him the scale was his 
and that he used it to measure the substance that he was selling. Id. at p. 102. Clark testified 
that Halls told him that he had methamphetamine in the two baggies previously and had used 
what was in there. Id. Eberling testified that the small baggies and the scales tested positive 
for methamphetamine. Id. at p. 87. 
After conviction and waiver of the presentence investigation report and the time for 
sentencing, Halls was sentenced to one to fifteen (1-15) years in the Utah State Prison on the 
second degree felony charge, one (1) year in the San Juan County Jail on the class A 
misdemeanor charge, and six (6) months in the San Juan County Jail on the class B 
misdemeanor charge. Id. at p. 188. 
On October 5,2004, the trial court entered the Judgment in this matter. R125-R127. 
On October 14,2004, Halls filed bis pro se Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. Rl 30. The 
Appellant's brief was filed on June 13,2005. The Appellee's brief was filed on September 
19,2005, and the Appellant's Reply brief was filed on October 28,2005. On April 13,2006, 
the Court of Appeals issued its Decision. On July 28, 2006, The Utah Supreme Court 
granted Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed June 5,2006, in this matter on the 
aforementioned issues. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In a decision handed down on June 7,2005, this Court determined that a reasonable 
doubt jury instruction containing the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it 
the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt in a criminal case based on a degree of 
proof below the requisite "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, f30. 
On April 13,2006, the Utah Court of Appeals issued the Decision challenged in this matter, 
which relies upon Reyes and the use of the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a jury 
instruction. The Court of Appeals applied the plain error standard and ruled that there was 
no error and no injustice in using this phrase, as long as the instruction as a whole correctly 
conveyed the principle of reasonable doubt to the jury. State v.Halls 2006 UT App. 142, ^ [20. 
The Court of Appeals decision herein contradicts this Court's holding in Reyes by failing to 
recognize the substantial risk inherent with the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubf'and 
violates the standard as held in Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1,114 S. Ct. 1239,127 L.Ed.2d 
583 (1994). 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THEIR DECISION REGARDING 
THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE 
PLAIN ERROR STANDARD IN A MATTER WHERE THE LAW HAD 
CLEARLY CHANGED ON APPEAL. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals recently issued the Decision for the instant matter 
determining that, although this Court abandoned the language of "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" in State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, the phrase "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" did not create manifest injustice because the reasonable doubt jury instruction taken 
as a whole correctly conveyed the principle of reasonable doubt to the jury. State v. Halls. 
2006 UT App 142 f 20. The inherent risk associated with this phrase was not addressed by 
the Court of Appeals. In issuing their decision in this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated that, if the jury instruction as a whole correctly conveyed the concept of beyond a 
reasonable doubt, no error or manifest injustice existed. By ruling that the instruction as a 
whole correctly conveyed the principle of beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has contradicted the decision of this court in State v. Reyes, and may have 
allowed Halls to be convicted on a degree of proof below that of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt," an action this Court specifically contravened in Reves. 
In Reves this Court undertook the following analysis: 
f25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial court 
erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at f 19. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart5 s dissent in State v. Ireland. 
773 P.2d 1375,1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). There, Justice 
Stewart took issue with an instruction that equated "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id. He 
reasoned that since the standard to be applied is "beyond a reasonable doubt," 
it followed that any definition of the standard must reference the 
obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by the evidence, and must convey 
the principle that the State must surmount the obstacle of reasonable doubt to 
justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept appears 
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to derive from a feat that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge 
against a defendant, a juror might misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard unless she is required to search out, confront, and defeat reasonable 
doubt with evidence. 
f26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect. 
Not every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient to create 
a reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best 
where proof is scant or lacking in credibility. In these instances, a description 
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their 
conviction concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and 
useful concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that 
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes 
them. A universal application of the notion that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the concept of the 
presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of inchoate 
reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it 
follows that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" in every case. We 
do not, however, endorse this unwieldy view of the presumption of innocence. 
f27 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubf'standard is 
also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree 
of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor 
standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's 
merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
"obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, 
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either 
to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction 
that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate 
basis to acquit. 
%28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the State to 
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the Notre Dame 
Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding prominence 
of the requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve Sheppard, The 
Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof 
Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence. 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 
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(2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice of this trend this way: 
A troubling conclusion that arises from the difficulties of the requirement of 
articulability is that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on the belief that 
the totality of the evidence is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity 
implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an obligation that appears focused 
on the details of the arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which 
the rhetoric of the law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state 
burden of proof, require acquittal. Id at 1213. 
f 29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and fairly communicated 
through an affirmative description of the degree of conviction that must be 
attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see little to be gained by 
including within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction the potentially 
confusing concept that every defendant is entitled to a presumption of 
reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate. 
f 30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element 
of Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
expressly abandon it 
Reves at 1ff24-30. (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant matter the Court of Appeals held that, because Halls did not object to 
the jury instruction at trial, he did not meet the requirements under UT. R. Civ. P. 19(e), and 
therefore, the instruction could only be assigned an error to avoid manifest injustice. The 
Court of Appeals stated that manifest injustice is "synonymous with the plain error standard." 
Halls at f 13-14. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reviewed the instruction under the plain 
error standard, which was erroneously applied to the instant matter. The Court of Appeals 
failed to apply the correct standard of exceptional circumstances, as argued in Halls9 briefing 
in the Utah Court of Appeals and articulated further herein. 
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Exceptional circumstances are explained as 'those which would explain and excuse 
a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah 
App.1990). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device/ to assure 
that manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State 
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991). 
Unlike "plain error," "exceptional circumstances" is not so much a precise 
doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a 
descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even 
though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine 
does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit 
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). In State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
App.1992), the Utah Court of Appeals employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric 
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised 
an issue at trial, as happened in Halls' case. 
The federal courts have expanded upon the concept of "exceptional circumstances," 
as argued by Halls before the Utah Court of Appeals, and utilized in Utah courts to include 
a "plain error" concept at the stage of appeal. In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed 
the plain error test as applied in United States v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725,113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 
L.Ed.2d508. Under the Olano test, similar to Utah's "plain error" test, "before an appellate 
court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) "error," (2) that is "plain," and 
(3) that "affect[s] substantial rights."507 U.S., at 732,113 S.Ct., at 1776. United States v. 
Johnson 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). However, in 
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Johnson the United States Supreme Court applied this "plain error" standard to appeals, 
explaining that "...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the 
law at the time of appeal-it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate 
consideration." Id. The Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's 
inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were 
plainly supported by existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that "a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases — pending on direct review 
—, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the 
past." Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. at 467, citing Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S. 314 
107 S. Ct.708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The United States Supreme Court addressed the 
retroactivity analysis1 when it stated: 
Specifically, we concluded that the retroactivity analysis for convictions that 
have become final must be different from the analysis for convictions that are 
not final at the time the new decision is issued. We observed that, in a number 
of separate opinions since [Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618,85 S.Ct. 1731, 
14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)], various Members of the Court have asserted that, at 
a minimum, all defendants whose cases were still pending on direct appeal at 
the time of the law-changing decision should be entitled to invoke the new 
rule. 
1
 Halls does not intend to raise the question of whether the determination in Reyes was 
"retroactive" under the typical meaning of the word as it pertains to changes in the law in Utah, 
but raises it only as it is applied under the Johnson analysis to cases currently pending on direct 
appeal whose decisions are not yet final. 
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Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 321-322, U.S.Ky.,1987, citing United 
States v. Johnson 57 U.S. 537, 545, 102 S.Ct, 2579, 2584, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). The 
Johnson Court ultimately determined that, because the law had changed during the time in 
which Johnson's case was pending direct review, Johnson met the first factor of the Olano 
test evidencing that there was an error. 
In the instant matter, the law regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction at the 
time of Halls' trial was settled. However, prior to Halls' appeal being filed, the law had 
changed based on this Court's holding in Reyes. Therefore, under Griffith, the change to the 
law regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction must be applied to Halls' case since it 
was pending direct appeal at the time the law changed in Reyes. Since the law changed 
during the time Halls' case was on direct review, an error does exist and the first factor of 
the Olano test has been met. 
The second factor of the Olano test is that the error must be plain, however, as 
explained in Johnson, the United States Supreme Court did not address in Olano at what 
stage of direct review the error must be plain, only that it must be plain under current law. 
Johnson at 467 (emphasis added). In Johnson, the error at the time of appeal was clear but 
was not clear at the time of trial, therefore the Court ruled that the second prong of the Olano 
test had been met. 
In the instant matter, at the time of Halls' trial, the law regarding the reasonable doubt 
jury instruction was settled, no error existed, and there was nothing to which his trial counsel 
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should have objected; however, at the time of appeal the law had changed and, under current 
law at the time of Halls' appeal, a plain error thus existed. As the Court ruled in Johnson. 
"it is enough that an error be plain at the time of appellate consideration." Johnson at 468. 
Therefore, under the "plain error on appeal" standard as set forth in Johnson, the second 
factor in Olano has clearly been met. 
The third factor of Olano is that the error must affect substantial rights. In Johnson. 
the Court held that the plain error fit within the scope of limited cases in which structural 
error existed, but did not determine that Johnson had proven that the error affected her 
substantial rights. The Court cited a case in which it held that, "the erroneous definition of 
'reasonable doubt' vitiated all of the jury's findings because one could only speculate what 
a properly charged jury might have done." Johnson at 469, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 
U.S. 275,280,113 S.Ct 2078,2082,124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Although the United States 
Supreme Court determined that Johnson did not meet the third factor under Olano. this is not 
the case in the instant matter. 
In the instant matter, the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" had a 
substantial affect on Halls' rights based upon this Court's determination in Reyes. Allowing 
the jury to use a phrase that has since been ruled constitutionally unsound by this Court 
affected Halls' rights because, as stated in Sullivan, it rendered the jury findings ineffective 
and only allowed the appellate court to speculate on what the jury may have done had they 
received a proper instruction. Allowing the jury to convict under the deficient instruction led 
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to a substantial risk that Halls was convicted on a standard that fell below that of the standard 
of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Use of the phrase affected Halls' due process rights, 
severely prejudicing Halls' constitutional rights. U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. V, VI, and XIV; 
and UT. CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. 
In Olano. the United States Supreme Court also held that, "[w]hen the first three parts 
of Olano are satisfied, an appellate court must then determine whether the forfeited error 
"'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings'" 
before it may exercise its discretion to correct the error. Olano, 507 U.S. at 36,113 S.Ct. at 
1779, quoting United States v. Atkinson. 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed.2d 
555 (1936). In the instant matter, the Court of Appeals did not address what repercussions 
may have come from the error in the jury instruction in the instant matter because they felt 
there was no error, although the instruction was clearly determined to be unconstitutional by 
this Court and violates the standard set forth in Victor, on which the decision of the Court 
of Appeals relies. Allowing a reasonable doubt jury instruction that has been determined to 
be unconstitutional stand would substantially affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings in allowing a violation of an individual's basic due process rights. 
U.S.C.A. CONST. AMEND. V, VI, and XIV § 1; and UT. CONST. ART. I §§ 7 and 12. 
U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV § 1, reads as follows: 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
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citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
(Emphasis added). UT. CONST., ART. I § 24, states that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." The Utah Court of Appeals recently held that "[t]he federal Equal 
Protection Clause and state's Uniform Operation of Laws Clause embody the same general 
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. 
ZXL,2005UTApp562,f8,fh.5,128P.3d561. The "fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings" articulated in Olano necessarily hinges in this matter on the question 
of whether Halls should be treated similarly under the analysis to the Reyes decision and, if 
Halls is found to be "similarly situated," then the federal Equal Protection Clause and our 
state's Uniform Operation of Laws Clause both dictate that he should be entitled to the rights 
as articulated under the Reyes analysis. 
Halls clearly is similarly situated to the analysis undertaken in Reyes. The Reyes 
decision, as more particularly set forth above, specifically dealt with the phrase "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" in the reasonable doubt jury instruction, wherein this Court abandoned the 
phrase as carrying a substantial risk that a jury could find a defendant guilty of a standard 
below "beyond a reasonable doubt." Halls jury instruction contained the phrase that carries 
the substantial risk. The Reyes decision came down on June 7,2005, and Halls filed his brief 
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in reliance upon that determination on June 12, 2005. Fairness, integrity and public 
reputation of judicial proceedings dictate that Halls should be allowed to rely upon case law 
current at the time of the filing of his direct appeal and should be afforded the protection 
from such unconstitutional phraseology, as found by this Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to address the issue regarding the application of 
exceptional circumstances in the instant matter. The law in this matter was settled at the time 
of Halls' trial, therefore, Halls' trial counsel could not have reasonably objected at trial, 
because no issue existed at that time. As Johnson stated, to place the burden in these 
instances on counsel to object would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a long and 
virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing 
precedent." Ibid., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. When Halls filed his appeal, there had 
been a substantial change in law and the interpretation of the law that would allow Utah's 
exceptional circumstances rubric to apply. The Utah Court of Appeals, however, erroneously 
applied Utah's "plain error" standard rather than the expanded federal "plain error on appeal" 
standard in the instant matter. The Utah Court of Appeals clearly should have applied the 
expanded "plain error on appeal" standard found under Johnson, supra, which successfully 
merges the necessary elements of Utah's "plain error" standard and mimics the Utah 
appellate court's holdings respecting Utah's "exceptional circumstances" rubric. 
Utah's "plain error"standard would have required that the trial court be aware of this 
Court's determination in Reyes prior to the decision being rendered and would have placed 
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an undue burden on the trial court to predict the outcome of Reyes or merit reversal based 
on their failure to do so. By failing to apply the correct "exceptional circumstances" rubric 
or the Johnson "plain error on appeal" standard, the Utah Court of Appeals mistakenly 
determined that Halls' due process rights and right to an impartial jury were protected. In 
its erroneous decision, the Utah Court of Appeals instead violated Halls' rights under the 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION and the UTAH CONSTITUTION, as cited herein supra. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION HEREIN DIRECTLY 
CONTRADICTS STATE V. REYES. 
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction in this matter, was the use of the 
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." In its decision the Court of Appeals stated that the 
parties in this matter do not dispute that the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" and 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" are similar. However, the Court of Appeals held that the 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" phrase used in the jury instruction was less troublesome than 
the "obviate all reasonable doubt phrase jury instruction." Halls at Tfl5. This cannot be so. 
Neither instruction can be considered less "troublesome" than the other. Using the word 
"eliminate" in the jury instruction in the instant matter led to the same substantial risk Reyes 
faced, namely that Halls was found guilty on a standard lower than "beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Allowing the word "eliminate" to be used created an even greater risk that Halls was 
convicted based on a standard that is less than "beyond a reasonable doubt." In Reyes this 
Court stated as follows: 
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The notion o f obviating9 doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or 
lacking in credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction concerning the 
strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that requires jurors to 
identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them. 
Reves at f26 (emphasis added). Requiring jurors to identify doubts and determine if the 
evidence overcomes them is, in essence, requiring them to "eliminate" all doubts. This 
process diminishes the standard that is necessary to convict and that diminished standard has 
been abandoned by this Court. The Utah Court of Appeals erred in determining that using 
the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" was less troublesome than using the phrase 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" because using the word "eliminate" created an even greater 
risk that Halls was convicted based on a standard that was lower than "beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
In the instant matter, the Court of Appeals relies on the language in Victor v. 
Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) to hold that, as long as the 
jury instruction taken as a whole correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, 
the requirements of due process are met. Halls at 116; see also, State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, 
1fl5, quoting Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1,114 S. Ct. 1239,127 L.ED.2d 583 (1994). The 
Court of Appeals also held that the standard of the instruction as a whole correctly conveying 
the principle of beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury is now the standard to be followed in 
"assessing the validity of reasonable doubt instructions." See State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, 
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f21,122 P.3d 543. The Court of Appeals did not address the risk involved with using the 
phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt," as specifically challenged on appeal by Halls. The 
Court of Appeals also failed to address the concept that Victor necessarily requires that a 
reasonable doubt jury instruction not "create a reasonable likelihood that 'a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof 
below that required by the Due Process Clause.'" Reyes at f 18, citing Victor at 6 {quoting 
Cage V.Louisiana. 498 U.S. 39,41,111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990)). 
If the remainder of the instruction conveyed the principle of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" to the jury, using the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" still caused that 
instruction to carry the substantial risk that a juror found Halls guilty based on a degree of 
proof lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." As this Court pointed out, use of the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" creates the substantial risk described above in a jury 
instruction, which risk violates the Victor standards, no matter what concept the remainder 
of the instruction may convey. Although Victor states that there is no due process violation 
as long as the instruction as a whole correctly coveys the concept of beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is not possible to use a phrase in that instruction that has been declared to carry a 
substantial risk, because it violates that Victor standard. Victor also states that the instruction 
cannot create a likelihood that guilt will be determined on a standard less than that of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." For the reasonable doubt jury instruction to comply with 
Victor standards in this matter, the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" could not exist 
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in the instruction. The standards as set forth in Victor cannot be met as long as the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" is included in the instruction. As analyzed by this Court in 
Reyes, it is not possible to have a constitutionally sound instruction that includes the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt." 
This Court specifically analyzed Victor and how the phrase "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" violated its standards when it stated in Reyes as follows: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of 
proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. 
The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's 
merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
"obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, 
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either 
to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction 
that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate 
basis to acquit. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 27,116 P.3d 305 (emphasis added). On the basis that it diminishes the 
degree of proof necessary to convict, the phrases "obviate all reasonable doubt" or "eliminate 
all reasonable doubt" cannot be utilized. Therefore, the remainder of the instruction cannot 
adequately convey the concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" since the phrase "eliminate 
all reasonable doubt" was included. Thus, in the instant matter, the Victor standard was 
violated in that it diminished the degree of proof necessary to convict and the appellate courts 
were left to "only speculate what a properly charged jury might have done." Johnson at 469, 
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citine Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 
(1993). 
In rendering their in this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals also relies on the matter 
of State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45,1f2l, 122 P.3d 543, in which this Court reiterated the Victor 
standard as the standard under which reasonable doubt jury instructions would be reviewed. 
In Cruz the State argued that the reasonable doubt jury instruction test as set forth in State 
v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), should be overruled. As set forth by Reves. this 
Court complied and held that the Victor standard for reasonable doubt jury instructions 
would apply. Cruz did not expand upon the Victor standards, nor did it overrule any of this 
Court's holdings in Reyes. In fact, Cruz upheld Reyes and reiterated that the Victor standard 
would apply to reasonable doubt jury instructions. 
In Reves. this Court held that the "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept was 
"linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect" and that the potential problem with this 
phrase is that it requires a two step undertaking which includes identification of the doubt 
and the testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. Hall at f 17. Allowing that 
phrase to be used in a jury instruction carries with it a substantial risk of guilt being founded 
on a standard lower than that of beyond a reasonable doubt. A phrase that was determined 
to be "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect" by this Court should not be used in a 
jury instruction, hence this Court's abandonment of this phrase. The Court of Appeals 
contends that, because the instruction used in the instant matter did not convey the message 
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that the State need only refute doubts that are sufficiently defined and the State may not have 
argued that a juror needed to articulate and eliminate specific doubts, there was no error or 
risk associated with this instruction. Id at f 18. However, under this Court's determination, 
the substantial inherent risk still existed based on the use of the phrase "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, lfl8, 116 P.3d 305. 
Further, the Court of Appeals failed to address the substantial risk associated with the 
phrase "obviate" or "eliminate" all reasonable doubt as used in this matter. They simply held 
that, if the instruction as a whole correctly conveys the principle of reasonable doubt as set 
forth under Victor, then there is no injustice or error. This contradicts this courts 
abandonment of the phrase in Reyes and its holding with regards to the substantial risk 
associated with the use of that phrase. This Court specifically indicated that this phrase 
violates Victor standards, which are the standards upon which the Utah Court of Appeals 
relied in rendering its decision in the instant matter. 
HI. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In State v. Villarreal 889 P.2d 419,425, (Utah, 1995), this Court stated, "[f]or an error 
to be reversible, it must be harmful." See UT. R..EVID. 103(a); UT. R..CRIM.P. 30(a); State 
v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992). The Court of Appeals held that an error does 
not require reversal if it is "'sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" Villarreal at 
958 {quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989)). That rule, however, does not 
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958 (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989)). That rule, however, does not 
govern errors that are constitutional in nature. Id. Where 'the error in question amounts to 
a violation of a defendant's right. . .guaranteed by . . .the United States Constitution, its 
harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is required unless the error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200,204 (Utah 1987), 
citine Harrington v. California. 395 U.S. 250,254,89 S.Ct. 1726,1728-29,23 L.Ed.2d 284 
(1969). 
In State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984), this Court held that, "[e]rror is 
reversible only if review of record persuades Supreme Court that without error there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant; this rule applies to errors 
injury instructions in criminal cases." In determining whether a federal constitutional error 
in the course of a criminal trial requires reversal, the United States Supreme Court analyzed 
this specific issue and stated as follows: 
The inquiry.. .is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty 
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must 
be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-
no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would 
violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have 
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt-not that the jury's actual 
finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been 
different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough. See Yates, supra, 
500 U.S., at 413-414,111 S.Ct, at 1898 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate 
speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the 
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State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of 
guilty. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607,614,66 S.Ct. 402,405, 
90L.Ed.350(1946). 
But the essential connection to a "beyond a reasonable doubt" factual finding 
cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of 
the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings. A reviewing court 
can only engage in pure speculation-its view of what a reasonable jury would 
have done. And when it does that, "the wrong entity judgefs] the defendant 
guilty." Rose, supra, 478 U.S., at 578, 106 S.Ct, at 3106. 
Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275, 280-281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 
(1993). In the instant matter, Halls has clearly shown that the jury instruction consisted of 
a misdescription of the burden of proof, as this Court specifically analyzed in Reyes. Thus, 
the jury findings are vitiated. This Court cannot speculate on what the jurors would have 
done absent the phrase at issue herein. Halls' constitutional rights were violated by the Utah 
Court of Appeals' determination and such violation can only be corrected by this Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this matter that directly contradicts 
this Court's decision in Reyes, effectively violating Halls' constitutional rights under 
U.S.C.A. CONST. AMENDS. V and VI and UTAH CONST., ART. I §§7, 12 and 24. Such a 
determination requires reversal of the Utah Court of Appeals' Decision, and remand for a 
new trial consistent with the current case law respecting language utilized in reasonable 
doubt jury instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Halls respectfully requests that this Court reverse and 
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remand the Utah Court of Appeals Decision dated April 13,2006, and any other relief this 
Court deems pertinent. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2006. 
K. Andrew Fit 
Attorney for Franklin Eric Halls 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
1l Defendant Franklin Eric Halls appeals from his convictions 
of one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
s§£ Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 2005); one count of 
unlawful possession of an imitation controlled substance, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37b-4 (2002); and one count of possession of 
paraphernalia, age Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On March 1, 2004, Officer Jim Eberling of the Monticello 
Police Department and Agent Travis Clark, a parole officer from 
the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, went 
to Defendant's parents1 house to speak to Defendant about a 
possible hit-and-run accident. Upon arriving, they discovered 
that Defendant was not home and decided to wait for him to return 
from work. Shortly thereafter, Defendant arrived at his parents1 
home in a pickup truck driven by Jim Abrams. 
13 Approaching Defendant's parents1 home, Abrams glanced over 
at Defendant and noticed him bending over. He testified that it 
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looked as if Defendant was shoving something under the seat, 
Abrams dropped off Defendant and left. 
14 When Abrams arrived at his own home, he checked under the 
seat and found a black box containing some bags and scales. 
Upset that Defendant would hide paraphernalia in his truck, 
Abrams took the items he found to the police station and gave 
them to Police Chief Adair. 
15 Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and Agent Clark conducted a 
search of Defendant, his bedroom, and his vehicle. Agent Clark 
accompanied Officer Eberling to Defendant's residence because 
Agent Clark had been having some problems with Defendant and 
because Defendant had recently tested positive for 
methamphetamine. After searching Defendant's bedroom and truck, 
Officer Eberling and Agent Clark took Defendant to the police 
station to question him regarding the hit-and-run accident and to 
possibly administer a urinalysis drug test. 
%6 As they arrived at the police station, Chief Adair was 
across the street searching Abramsfs truck. Officer Eberling and 
Agent Clark took Defendant into the station for questioning. 
During questioning, Chief Adair knocked on the door and handed 
Officer Eberling the items found under the seat in Abramsfs 
truck. Those items included a bag containing a white crystal 
substance, a black box containing a set of scales and a couple of 
small plastic bags, and a larger empty bag. Chief Adair 
explained to Officer Eberling how Abrams found these items. 
17 Officer Eberling and Agent Clark then began to question 
Defendant regarding the items. Defendant first denied that the 
items belonged to him, but he eventually admitted that the items 
were his. Defendant told Officer Eberling and Agent Clark that 
the white crystal substance was his and that it was not 
methamphetamine, but a cutting agent called "MSM." Defendant 
stated that he was planning to mix the cutting agent into an 
ounce of methamphetamine so that he could use one ounce for free 
and sell the other. Defendant also stated that the scales were 
used to weigh the methamphetamine he sold and admitted that two 
of the small plastic bags had contained methamphetamine. 
Subsequent testing confirmed that the white crystal substance was 
not methamphetamine; the small plastic bags and scales tested 
positive for methamphetamine. 
18 At trial, Defendant testified that he did not know anything 
about the items found in Abrams1s truck and denied owning them. 
Defendant stated that on the day he was questioned about the 
items found in Abramsfs truck, he believed the police had pulled 
Abrams over, searched his truck, and found the contraband. 
Because Officer Eberling and Agent Clark told Defendant that he 
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was already in trouble for violating his parole, he decided to 
admit ownership of the contraband to protect Abrams from any 
potential punishment. 
%9 The jury found Defendant guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance, possession of an imitation controlled 
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. After his 
conviction, Defendant stipulated to a prior conviction of 
possession of a controlled substance for purposes of enhancement, 
even though Defendant's prior judgment read that he was convicted 
of possession with intent to distribute. The trial court 
indicated that there was a clerical error in the prior judgment, 
but that Defendant clearly had the prior conviction to enhance 
Defendant's current conviction to a second degree felony, 
resulting in a one- to fifteen-year sentence. Defendant appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1l0 On appeal, Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction given at trial incorrectly stated the law and 
violated his due process rights. "Whether [a jury] instruction 
correctly states the law is reviewable under a correction of 
error standard, with no particular deference given to the trial 
court's ruling." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 
1993). However, rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides, in pertinent part: "Unless a party objects 
to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). Defendant admits 
that he never objected to the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
at trial. Therefore, pursuant to rule 19(e), Defendant's failure 
to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial 
renders the instruction "reviewable for plain error, or manifest 
injustice, rather than for correctness." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 
45,Hl6, 122 P.3d 543; see also State v. Casev. 2003 UT 55,140, 82 
P.3d 1106 ("[I]n most circumstances[,] the term manifest 
injustice is synonymous with the plain error standard . . . ." 
(quotations and citation omitted)). 
fll Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred when it 
enhanced Defendant's sentence based on the parties' stipulation 
that Defendant had a prior conviction for possession, because 
Defendant's prior judgment incorrectly stated that the prior 
conviction was for possession with the intent to distribute. 
According to Defendant, since the prior judgment is not correct, 
it cannot be a final judgment for the purposes of enhancement. 
However, because Defendant invited the error, which he now 
appeals, we will not review it. We will not review "an error 
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committed at trial when [Defendant] led the trial court into 
committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Defendant's Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction 
112 Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
given at his trial incorrectly stated the law and violated the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. At 
Defendant's trial, the reasonable doubt instruction was in 
compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), 
overruled in relevant part bv State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 
P.3d 305. It instructed the jury that lf[t]he State must 
eliminate all reasonable doubt." However, after Defendant's 
trial, the Utah Supreme Court expressly abandoned the "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" requirement of the Robertson test. State 
v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33,130, 116 P.3d 305. Relying on Reyes, see 
id.. Defendant now asserts that under the new standard, the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial violated his due 
process rights. 
113 Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, 
in pertinent part: "Unless a party objects to an instruction or 
the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be 
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(e). Because Defendant admits that he did not object 
to the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial, "we will only 
remand for a new trial if the error . . . constitutes a 'manifest 
injustice.1"1 Casey. 2003 UT 55 at 139. 
1. Based on the invited error doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that "if counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no 
objection to the jury instruction, we will not review the 
instruction under the manifest injustice exception." State v. 
Hamilton. 2003 UT 22,154, 70 P.3d 111. In this case, defense 
counsel not only failed to object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction, but also expressly agreed to the reasonable doubt 
jury instruction. Utah law has not addressed whether the invited 
error doctrine applies when there has been a change of settled 
law. However, federal law states that f![w]here a defendant 
submits proposed jury instructions in reliance on current law, 
and on direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally 
infirm, we will not apply the invited error doctrine. Instead, 
we will review for plain error." United States v. West Indies 
(continued...) 
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114 "[M]anifest injustice" has been defined as being "synonymous 
with the 'plain error1 standard." Id. at 140. The manifest 
injustice or the plain error standard requires the appellant to 
show that "' (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, 
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, 
our confidence in the verdict is undermined.1" Id. at 141 
(quoting State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)). It 
is under this plain error standard that we review Defendantf s 
appeal of the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at his 
trial. 
115 Under the first prong of the plain error standard, Defendant 
must show that "[a]n error exists." Id. Defendant asserts that 
the error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial 
is the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." In 
Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court expressly abandoned the phrase 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as a requirement for a reasonable 
doubt jury instruction. 2005 UT 33 at 130. For the purposes of 
this appeal, the parties do not dispute that "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" and "eliminate all reasonable doubt" are 
similar. However, we consider the "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" jury instruction to be less troublesome than the Reyes 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" instruction. 
116 In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme 
Court determined that Reyes effectively overruled the Robertson 
test for reasonable doubt jury instructions and adopted the test 
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Victor v. 
Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994). See Cruz. 2005 UT 45 at 121. 
The Victor test provides: 
[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on 
the necessity that the defendant's guilt be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising 
the jury of the government's burden of proof. 
Rather, "taken as a whole, the instructions 
1. (...continued) 
Transp.. Inc.. 127 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 1997). Because we 
similarly acknowledge an exception to the preservation rule for 
exceptional circumstances "where a change in law or the settled 
interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue 
at trial," State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
we do not apply the invited error doctrine here. 
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[must] correctly convey the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the jury." 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 (second alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). This overarching principle, that "taken as a whole, 
[the reasonable doubt jury instruction must] correctly 
communicate the principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury, is 
now the standard for "assessing the validity of reasonable doubt 
instructions." Cruz. 2005 UT 45 at 121. Therefore, if 
Defendants reasonable doubt jury instruction, "'taken as a 
whole, . . . correctly convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt 
to the jury,1" id. at 120 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22), then 
it was not erroneous. We conclude that Defendant's jury 
instruction was not in error. 
117 The Reves court found the "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
concept "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect." 2005 
UT 33,1(26, 116 P.3d 305. The potential problem with the "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" requirement is that it 
contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of 
the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence . . . . The "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard does not, however, condition 
a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an 
ability either to articulate the doubt or to 
state a reason for it. 
Id. at K27. Therefore, "ftlo the extent that the Robertson 
'obviate1 test would permit the State to argue that it need only 
obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test works to 
improperly diminish the State's burden." Id. at 128 (emphasis 
added). Essentially, the obviate test's "substantial risk of 
causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below 
beyond a reasonable doubt," id, at 130, comes from its potential 
to allow the State to argue that a juror must articulate and 
obviate specific doubts. 
118 This is not the situation here. The trial court's jury 
instruction stated: 
A defendant is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption follows the defendant 
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt 
is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
defendant should be acquitted. 
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The [S]tate must eliminate all 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is not proof to an absolute certainty. 
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, 
which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a doubt 
based on fancy, imagination, or wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is enough proof to satisfy 
the mind, or convince the understanding of 
those bound to act conscientiously, and 
enough to eliminate reasonable doubt. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable 
people would entertain based upon the 
evidence in the case. 
1l9 This reasonable doubt jury instruction given at Defendant's 
trial did not convey the message that the State must only 
eliminate those doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did 
the State argue that the juror need articulate and eliminate 
specific doubts. Instead, the jury instruction, "taken as a 
whole, correctly communicate[d] the principle of reasonable 
doubt" to the jury. Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at 121. 
1(20 Although the language "obviate all reasonable doubt" has 
been abandoned by Reyes. see 2005 UT 33 at 134, we are not 
persuaded that the use of "eliminate all reasonable doubt" in 
Defendant's jury instruction constitutes manifest injustice 
because the reasonable doubt jury instruction "correctly 
communicate[d] the principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury. 
State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,121, 122 P.3d 543.2 Therefore, we do 
not remand for a new trial. 
II. Defendant's Sentence Enhancement 
121 Defendant also claims that the trial court erred when it 
enhanced his sentence based on a prior conviction of possession 
of a controlled substance, even though Defendant stipulated to 
the prior conviction. Essentially, Defendant argues that because 
the judgment from his first conviction for possession incorrectly 
stated that he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 
2. In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122 P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed reasonable doubt jury instructions that included 
the phrase "dispel all reasonable doubt" and found that those 
instructions were not erroneous. Id. at ffll, 18. Because 
"dispel all reasonable doubt" and "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" are functionally equivalent, Defendant's reasonable doubt 
jury instruction is not erroneous. 
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distribute, when he actually only pleaded to simple possession, 
the judgment is ineffectual. 
122 Defendant repeatedly stipulated to the fact that he had a 
prior conviction for possession, thereby inviting the error he 
now appeals. "[0]n appeal, a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 
1993). After jury selection, counsel for Defendant told the 
trial court that if the jury found Defendant guilty, Defendant 
would stipulate to a prior conviction for possession. Defense 
counsel also explained that the prior judgment contained a 
clerical error, but that Defendant was still willing to stipulate 
to the prior conviction. Moreover, after Defendant was found 
guilty, Defendant again stipulated to the prior conviction for 
possession. When the trial court asked if there was lf[a]ny legal 
reason why sentence should not be pronounced," counsel for 
Defendant replied, "None, your honor." 
123 Clearly, Defendant invited the alleged error he now appeals 
by repeatedly stipulating to the fact that he had a prior 
conviction for possession. The rationale behind this stipulation 
is clear: regardless of whether the prior conviction was for 
simple possession or possession with intent to distribute, the 
prior conviction enhanced the Defendant's sentence. Therefore, 
because Defendant invited the error he now appeals, we will not 
review it.3 
3. In the alternative, Defendant argues that his counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance because he counseled Defendant to 
stipulate to the prior conviction. However, even if we were to 
find defense counsel's assistance defective for this reason, 
Defendant cannot prove that "but for counsel's deficient 
performance[,] there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome . . . would have been different." Wickham v. Galetka, 
2002 UT 72,1(19, 61 P.3d 978 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that 
" [c]lerical mistakes in judgments . . . may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may 
order." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, a 
clerical error, once determined, can be amended and made 
"effective as of a prior date so that the record accurately 
reflects that which took place." Preece v. Preece. 682 P.2d 298, 
299 (Utah 1984). Because both the trial court and the parties 
agreed that the error in the prior judgment was simply clerical, 
the prior judgment would still be final and effective for the 
purposes of enhancing Defendant's sentence. 
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CONCLUSION 
f24 The reasonable doubt jury instruction given at Defendant's 
trial is not manifestly unjust because it correctly conveyed the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Further, because 
Defendant invited the error, we decline to address Defendant's 
claim that his sentence enhancement is somehow erroneous because 
of a clerical error in Defendant's prior judgment. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
125 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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